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SUMMARY
Using exceptionally rich linked administrative and survey information on German welfare recipients we investigate
the health effects of transitions from welfare to employment and of assignments to welfare-to-work programmes.
Applying semi-parametric propensity score matching estimators we ﬁnd that employment substantially increases
(mental) health. The positive effects are mainly driven by males and individuals with bad initial health conditions
and are largest for males with poor health. In contrast, the effects of welfare-to-work programmes, including
subsidised jobs, are ambiguous and statistically insigniﬁcant for most outcomes. Copyright r 2010 John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many Western economies recently reformed their welfare and unemployment beneﬁt schemes with the
intention of activating beneﬁt recipients and speeding up their reintegration into the labour market. The
majority of studies analyse whether speciﬁc instruments or policy reforms succeed in terms of raising
employment and earnings of unemployment beneﬁt and welfare recipients (e.g. Heckman et al., 1999;
Grogger and Karoly, 2005; LaLonde, 2003; Kluve, 2006). In this study, we analyse whether such
successful activation strategies come with particular additional beneﬁts in terms of improved health.
This would not only be beneﬁcial for the former beneﬁt recipients, but also for the society as a whole.
Health-care costs would be reduced, the work capacity of the individuals might increase, and they may
become less likely to exit the labour force via the various disability insurance schemes. All of this would
ease the burden on the welfare state.
This paper investigates whether ﬁnding work or participating in welfare-to-work programmes affects
different aspects of mental and physical health of German welfare recipients. In Germany, welfare
payments are made to people with no or insufﬁcient income to support themselves and dependent
household members. At least about half of all recipients are unemployed individuals who are ineligible
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for unemployment insurance payments (e.g., due to an exhaustion of their claim). In summary, German
welfare recipients have unfavourable employment histories, are (long-term) unemployed, or employed
with very low earnings.
Our econometric analysis is based on semi-parametric matching estimators. This estimation
technique is attractive due to its robustness to functional form assumptions and it exploits the unusually
informative data the analysis is based on. We use individual data on German welfare recipients collected
after the recent reform of the German unemployment insurance and welfare system (the so-called Hartz
IV reforms) that came into effect in January 2005.3 Administrative data from various sources covering
1998–2007 lead to considerable information on up to 10 years of employment, unemployment, and
earnings histories of welfare recipients. These administrative records were linked to two waves of a
panel survey as well as detailed information on local labour market conditions and local employment
ofﬁces. Furthermore, the panel survey collected detailed ‘soft’ information, e.g. on the social
background, as well as on self-reported health. It is argued below that such information is indeed
needed to address our research question in a credible way.
As many welfare recipients are long-term unemployed, the literature on the health effects of job loss
and unemployment is related to this paper. Several studies in medicine and social sciences have found a
negative association between unemployment and various aspects of self-assessed and objective health,
see for instance Bjo¨rklund (1985) and the surveys by Jin et al. (1997), Bjo¨rklund and Eriksson (1998),
and Mathers and Schoﬁeld (1998).
More recently, considerable efforts were made towards the identiﬁcation of causal effects of
unemployment on health. Based on 5 years of the European Household Panel, Bo¨ckerman and
Ilmakunnas (2009) compare those continuously employed with individuals that experience spells of
unemployment. Using semi-parametric matching and difference-in-difference methods, they ﬁnd no
health effects and therefore consider the negative correlation of health and employment as spurious.
They argue that this is due to poorer health of the unemployed before they actually become
unemployed, meaning that individuals with bad health are more likely to enter unemployment. One
contribution of Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2009) is the acknowledgement of the importance of
controlling for health in a period when both groups considered are in the same labour market state.
Other papers attempting to uncover causal health effect use plant closures as instrument to control for
the endogeneity between unemployment and health (e.g. Browning et al., 2006; Kuhn et al., 2007) or
mortality (e.g. Eliason and Storrie, 2009). In the case of a closure one expects that dismissal affects all
employees and is thus not related to health.4 In contrast to the earlier literature that was more based on
empirical associations only, these studies come to contradictory conclusions.
As becoming unemployed or welfare-dependent has an immediate negative impact on income,
another related ﬁeld is the research on the effects of the socio-economic status, as for example measured
by income and education, on health outcomes. Again, how to deal with the endogeneity problem of
health and income is the key issue, and different ways to approach that problem might explain the
divergence of the results in this literature. Recent studies exploiting long panel data (e.g. Frijters et al.,
3Before the introduction of a coherent system of welfare beneﬁts and welfare-to-work programmes in 2005, there existed two
parallel systems in Germany. On the one hand, unemployed individuals who had exhausted their unemployment insurance (UI)
claim were eligible for means-tested unemployment assistance, which replaced up to 57% of their previous net earnings. On the
other hand, needy individuals who were never eligible for UI payments received a means-tested lump-sum social assistance
payment the amount of which depended on household composition and income. The so-called Hartz IV reforms removed this
asymmetry by combining unemployment and social assistance to one single means-tested welfare payment that is independent of
previous earnings. Its level depends on household size, composition, and income similar to the former social assistance. Eligibility
depends on being physically and mentally capable of working for at least 15 h per week, active job search, and willingness to
participate in welfare-to-work programmes. Non-compliance with these rules, or the rejection of acceptable job offers, can be
sanctioned by temporary beneﬁt cuts.
4A related strategy is to use involuntary job losses as instrument (e.g. Gallo et al., 2000, 2006). This is, however, more problematic
as it does not exclude the possibility of ﬁrms to sort on the health conditions.
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2005, Lindahl, 2005, Smith, 2007, Gravelle and Sutton, 2009) conclude that income has a positive effect
on health. Several studies, a majority of which appeared in different branches of the medical literature,
consider the relationship between welfare receipt and health over different horizons, at different stages
of the life cycle, and for different countries.5 These papers have in common that their focus is on
empirical associations and attempts to uncover causal relationships are limited.
We contribute to the literature in several dimensions. First, this is to our best knowledge the ﬁrst study
that analyses transitions out of unemployment or welfare receipt. Second, the data allow us to use an
econometric design in which all individuals have the same employment status initially, i.e. they are all on
welfare. By doing so and controlling for health and other conditions at this initial stage, most issues
leading to reversed causality from health to the labour market status can be ruled out. Third, the welfare
population our results apply to is particularly interesting as it represents the group with the least
favourable social conditions and employment prospects. This group provides a particular challenge to
policy makers with respect to labour market integration and health issues. Fourth, the econometric
analysis is based on exceptionally rich data of linked survey and administrative information on individuals,
households, regions, and local employment ofﬁces. As most studies use either surveys or administrative
data they generally rely on a less informative set of variables. The richness of the data increases our
conﬁdence to come comparably close to the ‘causal’ effects. Fifth, we assess effect heterogeneity in several
dimensions. Finally, we use rather ﬂexible econometric methods, namely semi-parametric propensity score
matching and, as a robustness check, semi-parametric conditional IV estimators (the results of which are
presented in the Internet appendix, see http://www.sew.unisg.ch/lechner/h4_health). In contrast to
commonly used parametric methods, these robust methods have the advantage that they do not rely on
tight, but arbitrary functional form assumptions that are most likely violated in reality.
Our results suggest that entering employment affects health positively, mainly through a substantial
increase in mental health. Welfare recipients who were employed at some point between the two survey
interviews have on average a higher daily work capacity, fewer symptoms pointing to health problems, a
smaller probability to suffer from mental symptoms (as anxieties and problems with sleep) or to feel
lethargic and depressed. The effects are signiﬁcant and economically important, which is line with
ﬁndings in Burgard et al. (2005), Gallo et al. (2000, 2006), and Kuhn et al. (2007), but not with
Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2009), Browning et al. (2006), and Salm (2009). The results are
particularly pronounced for men, as well as for individuals with relatively bad initial health and are thus
strongest for men with poor health. The effects of programme participation, including low-paid
subsidised jobs, however, are ambiguous. The majority of the effects of programme participation are
insigniﬁcant and most notably, the effect on overall health is close to zero. In conclusion, a rapid
reintegration into the ‘normal’ labour market, as intended by recent welfare reforms, seems to be in the
interest of both welfare recipients and policy makers also for health reasons.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides some background on welfare
receipt in Germany. Section 3 characterizes our linked administrative and survey data and the health
information available. Section 4 deﬁnes the sample and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses
identiﬁcation and econometric estimation. Section 6 presents the main results of the paper, which are based on
propensity score matching. Section 7 provides evidence on effect heterogeneity for various subgroups. Section
8 shows the robustness checks based on parametric linear and nonlinear regressions. Section 9 concludes.6
5E.g., see Boothroyd and Olufokunbi (2001), Butterworth et al. (2004), Byrne et al. (1998), Coiro (2001), Danziger et al. (2001),
Eaton et al. (2001), Ensminger (1995), Ensminger and Juon (2001), Jayakody et al. (2000), Kalil et al. (2001), Kovess et al. (2001).
6Further information is provided in an appendix that is available on the internet (http://www.sew.unisg.ch/lechner/h4_health). It
contains a data appendix that presents some statistics on attrition and describes the evaluation sample, descriptive statistics for
additional control variables not included in Section 3 as well as for variables used in the IV regressions. It also comprises the
probit coefﬁcient estimates for the propensity score models, statistics about match quality, technical information about and the
results of semi-parametric IV estimation, an excerpt of survey questions related to health, and institutional information about
welfare receipt in Germany.
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2. WELFARE RECEIPT IN GERMANY
In Germany, welfare payments are made to households with no or insufﬁcient income to support
themselves. At least about half of all recipients are unemployed individuals who are ineligible for or
have exhausted unemployment insurance payments. Welfare is conditional on a means-test. Eligibility
and amount of welfare depend on household composition and income. Only individuals of age 15–64
who are capable of working at least 15 h per week as well as their dependent children are eligible.
Households receive a cash payment that is supposed to cover food, clothing, etc. Accommodation and
heating costs are also covered (up to a maximum) but are paid directly to the property owners.
Claimants have to register with the local employment ofﬁce and are obliged to participate in welfare-to-
work programmes if requested to do so. In summary, German welfare recipients have unfavourable
employment histories, are (long-term) unemployed, or employed with very low earnings.
3. DATABASE
3.1. General description of the data
Our analysis is based on a unique data set that combines various data sources. The core of these data is a
survey of welfare recipients who were interviewed in two waves at the beginning (January–April 2007)
and around the end of 2007 (November 2007–March 2008). The stock sample in the survey includes
roughly 21 000 individuals receiving welfare in October 2006. Despite 93% of interviewees agreeing in the
ﬁrst wave to participate in the follow-up interview, attrition was non-negligible, mainly due to relocation
and refusal to participate, which leaves us with 13 914 panel cases. In the Internet appendix, we provide
the means of the health variables and the employment status at interview 1 (i.e. before the intervention
takes place) for the panel cases and those who only responded in the ﬁrst wave, see Table I.0. The means
are very similar for all variables, suggesting that attrition is (e.g. in contrast to Goldberg et al., 2006;
Jones et al., 2006) not related to initial health (which is used as part of the control variables in the further
analysis) and should therefore not entail important biases in the subsequent analysis.7
Our sample is not drawn randomly from the population of welfare recipients, but is stratiﬁed.
Stratiﬁcation is based on the following individual characteristics: age (15–24/25–49/50–64), children
under age 3 are in the household, and being a single parent. This is done to ensure that the number of
observations is sufﬁciently high for these groups. The two latter groups as well as the younger and older
individuals are considered to face a particularly high risk of entering and staying in welfare and are,
thus, of particular interest to policy makers. All descriptive statistics and estimation results we present in
this paper are based on the original unweighted data. However, the Internet appendix (Table I.13) also
provides the main estimates using the sample weights that correct for stratiﬁcation. All conclusions
remain unchanged as the health effects are very similar with and without weights. The only difference
when using the stratiﬁcation weights is that the estimates become noisier. Thus, the main text focuses on
the results for the unweighted sample.
The survey is unique with respect to the information available for welfare recipients and sample sizes.
It includes individual socio-economic characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, education,
nationality and migration background, labour market status and labour market history, last occupation,
and welfare receipt. It also contains details on self-assessed health in various dimensions, as well as
questions related to social background, social integration, and satisfaction with the life situation and the
7However, the remaining concern might be that there are further health shocks after wave one that are by construction
unobservable for the non-respondents. Again, as their likelihood of occurrence should depend on past health and other health
predictors, by conditioning on past health as well as many other variables from the ﬁrst wave that are health predictors, the
problem should not be substantial in our analysis.
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employment ofﬁce. Finally, it includes information on the household such as the number, age, and
employment status of other household members as well as the interviewees’ relation to them.
The survey information has been linked to administrative records provided by Germany’s Federal
Employment Agency (FEA) for the period 1998–2007. The linked panel sample consists of 12 433
individuals, as some welfare recipients denied the permission to link the data and/or no such
administrative records were available. The administrative data combine spell information from social
insurance and programme participation records as well as the beneﬁt payment and jobseeker registers.
They comprise very detailed information in several dimensions. Personal characteristics include
education, age, gender, marital status, number of children, profession, nationality, disabilities, and
health. The beneﬁt payment register provides information on type and amount of unemployment
insurance beneﬁts received as well as remaining claims. The jobseeker register includes additional
information on the desired form of employment and compliance with beneﬁt rules. Moreover, the data
include information on previous employment including the type of employment, industry, occupation,
and earnings. With respect to programme participation, the type of the program and its actual duration,
as well as the planned duration (for training only) is included.
Finally, the linked administrative and survey data were merged with information at the agency and
regional level. The latter includes a range of regional characteristics reﬂecting labour market conditions
(e.g. share of (long-term) unemployment, share of welfare recipients, GDP per worker, population
density, and industry structure). The former characterize the agencies’ organisational structure,
placement strategies, and counselling concept. This allows us to observe an extensive list of factors that
might impact on employment and health, which will be crucial for our identiﬁcation strategy.
For the econometric analysis to be outlined further below, we restrict the evaluation sample to
individuals who entered welfare within 12 months before interview 1. Otherwise, the follow-up period
after the transition would be relatively short compared to the pre-transition period on welfare such that
the health state after the transition might be predominantly driven by the long welfare history.
Furthermore, we discard individuals stating not to receive welfare beneﬁts at interview 1 (246 obs.), being
younger than 26 (1486), or having missing values in the outcomes (183) and pre-transition outcomes (182).
The evaluation sample consists of 2849 individuals, for whom three welfare states are considered:
remaining on welfare (henceforth W), ﬁnding employment (E), and programme participation (P).8 The
transition period contains all months after interview 1 up to (and including) the last month before
interview 2 (when the outcome is measured). Whereas state W is deﬁned as receiving welfare over the
whole transition period, E and P only require to be employed or in a programme, respectively, for at least
1 month. The Internet appendix provides more details on the evaluation sample and the welfare states.9
3.2. The information on health
As brieﬂy mentioned in the last section, our data include self-assessed information on the general health
status and the prevalence of symptoms related to physical, mental, and psychosomatic deﬁciencies.
General health is covered by the assessment of one’s overall health on a scale from 1 (very good) to 5
(poor) and the capacity to work up to a speciﬁc number of hours per day (1: less than 3 hrs, 2: 3 to less
than 6 hrs, 3: 6 to less than 8 hrs, 4: 8 hrs and more). Based on these variables we also construct indicator
variables for ‘very good, good, or satisfactory health’ and of ‘’being capable of working 6 or more hrs
per day’.
The survey comprises indicators for a range of symptoms pointing to health problems: gastro-
intestinal problems, cardiovascular problems, nerval problems and anxieties, allergies and skin
problems, problems with back/neck/spine/intervertebral discs, problems with bones and joints,
8The majority of programmes are relatively short job search assistance and training programmes, as well as workfare programmes.
9See http://www.sew.unisg.ch/lechner/h4_health.
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problems with sleeping, and no symptoms. Information on symptoms complements the general health
judgements as it is directly related to tangible deﬁciencies. It allows constructing a variable reﬂecting the
total number of symptoms and dummies for various categories of symptoms, namely ‘physical’
(problems with back/neck/spine/intervertebral discs and/or with bones and joints), ‘mental’ (nerval
problems, anxieties, and/or problems with sleeping), and ‘psychosomatic’ (gastro-intestinal,
cardiovascular, and/or allergies and skin problems). Furthermore, the survey includes an indicator
for whether the respondent is ‘often lethargic and depressed’, which also points to mental health
problems. The Internet appendix provides an excerpt of all questions related to health.
The health information in our data is subjective, i.e. not obtained by some medical examination,
which would be infeasible for such a large population. As a consequence, so-called ‘justiﬁcation bias’
may be a source of concern: individuals may underreport their true health status to justify receiving
welfare receipt. Comparing working and non-working individuals based on cross-sectional data on
subjective health and medical records Baker et al. (2004) show, for example, that justiﬁcation bias is not
only an issue for general health status, but also for subjective information about well-deﬁned, narrow
medical problems and symptoms, although the overall magnitude of reporting bias is not large in their
study. However, well-deﬁned indicators of symptoms and medical conditions, as we also have in our
study, are typically considered to be less sensitive to that problem (e.g. van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003;
Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004).
Justiﬁcation bias leads to non-classical measurement error and endogeneity problems.10 Therefore,
reliable remedies require an instrument and/or an objective measure coming from medical records, see
for instance Bound (1991), or Maurer et al. (2007). Otherwise point identiﬁcation is lost and a bounding
approach may be used instead as in Kreider and Pepper (2007, 2008). It is important to note that these
remedies work only under strong assumptions when health is used as an explanatory variable. When
health is an outcome variable and there is non-classical measurement error, a nonparametric solution of
this (identiﬁcation) problem can generally not exist without additional (usually objective medical)
information that allows to assess the bias in some sense.11
The phenomenon of justiﬁcation bias is extensively documented in the literature on the transition
from work to disability (e.g. Benı´tez-Silva et al., 2004, and Kreider and Pepper, 2007) and from work to
(early) retirement (e.g. Bound, 1991; Kalwij and Vermeulen, 2008), both exit strategies from the labour
market. So far there is, however, no evidence for the transition from welfare to work. There is a
fundamental difference between these transitions. Eligibility for disability beneﬁts is directly related to
health implying that there is a strong incentive to understate one’s health status. For (early) retirement
individuals have to argue to employers, neighbours, family members, etc. why they cannot continue to
work. A deterioration of health seems one of the most plausible arguments in most of these cases. If they
cannot convince (in particular) employers, employees may not be able to exit, which may reduce their
utility considerably.
In contrast, the majority of welfare recipients are staying involuntarily. Moreover, there is no
ﬁnancial incentive to underreport health as eligibility is independent of health. In fact, there is an
incentive not to appear too unhealthy as the capability of working is a precondition for receiving
the beneﬁts: individuals not capable of working at least 15 hrs per week receive considerably lower
beneﬁts. Yet, bad health may be used as an excuse for low job search activity and refusal of job
interviews and job offers. But this seems to be a behaviour that would be constant over time and can,
thus, be taken care of by conditioning on reported pre-intervention health, as done in this study.
10Despite the issue of biased reporting, Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2009) argue that various subjective health measures have
been proven to have substantial value in predicting objective health outcomes and are for this reason alone worth analyzing.
11By their very nature, instrumental variable estimators can be seen as purging an explanatory variable from its ‘endogenous’
component by ﬁltering out the effect of the exogenous components and subsequently inﬂating the result on the outcome
accordingly. It is not obvious how to apply such an idea directly to an outcome variable.
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A remaining incentive could be justifying being on welfare by a bad health condition to make it socially
and personally more acceptable. This incentive seems much weaker compared with the ones discussed
above, though. Furthermore, it is a priori not clear how much of this will appear in an anonymous
survey at all.
There are further arguments why the problem of justiﬁcation bias should be less severe in our
application. Health information will be used in two ways: as conditioning variables (measured in the
pre-intervention period at interview 1), and as outcome variables (measured in the post-intervention
period at interview 2). Here, the use of health as conditioning variable is innocuous as everybody in our
sample is on welfare before the intervention and because we condition on how long individuals have
been on welfare. Thus, problems related to justiﬁcation bias in the conditioning variable are ruled out
by construction. What remains is the potential bias of the health outcomes measured after the
(potential) transition into employment or a programme. First note that justiﬁcation bias is probably not
an issue among programme participants, as they still receive welfare so that their social status has hardly
changed. Second, by conditioning on the pre-intervention values of the health outcomes we control for
any time-constant sources of justiﬁcation bias. So what we might worry about is that welfare recipients
report ever worse health the longer they stay on welfare. However, the descriptive statistics show that
for those who remain on welfare, reported health does on average not deteriorate with increasing
duration on welfare in any substantial way (see Table I.2 in the Internet appendix). Assuming that the
true health does not improve on average due to welfare, which appears reasonable given the evidence in
the literature on welfare and unemployment discussed in the introduction, increasing justiﬁcation bias
does not seem to be an issue in our sample.
In summary, although we cannot rule out (or test for) justiﬁcation bias, so far there is no evidence
from other studies on the existence of such bias for the transition from welfare to work. However, most
important is the argument that in our particular study design its occurrence in any relevant magnitude
seems to be unlikely.
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table I reports the mean values of various socio-economic characteristics, variables characterising
labour market and welfare histories, regional characteristics, initial health states, and (post-transition)
health outcomes for all welfare states in the evaluation sample in order to assess selectivity with regard
to the transition into the various states.12 Note that the descriptive statistics and all estimations
presented further below refer to the stratiﬁed sample, where particular socio-economic groups are
oversampled, see Section 3. Individuals switching into employment are on average younger, better
educated, and more often males than those individuals on welfare and in programmes. They also tend to
have more favourable labour market histories, e.g. their current and past mean duration on welfare is
the shortest while their work experience is on average the highest. Particularly noteworthy is the fact
that they enjoy considerably better initial health conditions. As initial health is strongly correlated with
health later in life, this points to potentially strong selection effects that empirical studies lacking
information on pre-transition health may fail to control for. Furthermore, individuals in E more often
live in areas with a comparably small share of long-term unemployment.
Programme participants and those remaining on welfare are similar in terms of age, gender, and
education. However, the latter more often take care of children and are less likely to currently seek for a
job pointing to a decreased labour market attachment. This is also supported by poorer initial health
state and a higher prevalence of a long-term illness. Interestingly, the share of migrants in P is smaller
than in W. Furthermore, programme participants more often live in East Germany, where active labor
12For further descriptive statistics we refer to the Internet appendix (http://www.sew.unisg.ch/lechner/h4_health).
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market policies (ALMPs) play a relatively important role ever since the German uniﬁcation, and in
areas with a high share of long-term unemployment. They are also more likely to have participated in
programmes earlier in life.
The lower panel of Table I displays several health outcomes. The differences in the outcomes across
welfare states are substantial but cannot be interpreted causally due to the selection problem.
Table I. Means of selected variables across welfare (W), employment (E), and programme (P)
Socio-economic characteristics at ﬁrst interview W E W P E P
Age (years) 45 41 45 44 41 44
Female (binary) 0.52 0.44 0.56 0.56 0.44 0.54
Migrant (binary) 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.30 0.25
Taking care of children (binary) 0.23 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.16
Single parent (binary) 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09
No school-leaving qualiﬁcations (binary) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Elementary schooling (binary) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Lower secondary schooling (Hauptschule) (binary) 0.44 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.45
Higher secondary schooling (Realschule) (binary) 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.35
Matriculation standard (binary) 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.16
No professional degree (binary) 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
Vocational education (binary) 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.59
Technical school, college or university (binary) 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.28
Labour market and welfare histories at ﬁrst interview
Duration of current welfare receipt (months) 1.95 1.65 1.90 1.95 1.55 1.95
Duration of current unemployment (months) 5.70 3.50 5.95 5.75 3.20 5.95
Mean duration of welfare receipt since beg. of 2005 (months) 6.20 5.70 6.40 6.85 5.40 6.85
Months regularly employed since beg. of 2005 1.75 3.25 1.95 2.30 3.50 2.10
Months in minor employment since beg. of 2005 1.20 1.20 2.00 1.35 1.30 0.80
Currently job seeker (binary) 0.53 0.81 0.55 0.70 0.00 0.00
Public employment programme in the 2 years before welfare (bin.) 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.21 0.05 0.21
Training programme in the 2 years before welfare (binary) 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.22
Regional characteristics at ﬁrst interview
Normalized (to mean zero) regional share of long-term unemployed 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.03
Normalized (to mean zero) population density 0.62 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.64
Eastern Germany (binary) 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.37 0.26 0.34
Health at ﬁrst interview
Long-term illness (binary) 0.21 0.07 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.12
Recognized severe disability (binary) 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.17
Very good, good, or satisfactory health (binary) 0.49 0.69 0.50 0.62 0.69 0.61
Capable of working 6 or more hours per day (binary) 0.73 0.90 0.73 0.84 0.90 0.85
Psychosomatic symptoms (binary) 0.45 0.35 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.37
Mental symptoms (binary) 0.35 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.35
Physical symptoms (binary) 0.57 0.46 0.55 0.54 0.46 0.52
Number of symptoms (integer) 1.97 1.42 1.91 1.72 1.44 1.73
Feeling often lethargic and depressed (binary) 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.26
Health at second interview
Very good, good, or satisfactory health (binary) 0.50 0.68 0.51 0.59 0.70 0.58
Capable of working 6 or more hours per day (binary) 0.70 0.92 0.71 0.84 0.92 0.86
Psychosomatic symptoms (binary) 0.45 0.35 0.44 0.35 0.34 0.34
Mental symptoms (binary) 0.34 0.23 0.35 0.34 0.24 0.35
Physical symptoms (binary) 0.55 0.46 0.56 0.50 0.47 0.49
Number of symptoms (integer) 1.92 1.35 1.89 1.67 1.36 1.64
Feeling often lethargic and depressed (binary) 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.21
Observations 917 461 1142 245 382 185
Notes: Means refer to the evaluation sample. Comparison W-E is conditional on not being employed at interview 1. Comparison
W-P is conditional on not being in a programme at interview 1. Comparison E-P is conditional on not being employed or in a
programme at interview 1. This explains the difference in sample sizes of the same welfare state across comparisons. See the
Internet appendix for more details.
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5. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
5.1. Identiﬁcation
5.1.1. General issues. For individuals initially on welfare, we want to understand the health effects of a
transition into employment or a programme vs. staying on welfare without employment or a
programme, respectively. We deﬁne those states as being in employment or in a programme for at least
one month between the interviews 1 and 2. Note that employment is not conditional on the continuation
or termination of welfare receipt: individuals may or may not be on welfare when working.
Identiﬁcation of causal effects requires us to infer the counterfactual health state, i.e. the potential
health of working individuals had they remained on welfare without a job as well as the potential health
of programme participants had they not participated.
As shown in Section 4, individuals in employment or programmes differ from those on welfare. Assume,
for instance, that welfare recipients with better initial health have ceteris paribus a higher probability to
ﬁnd work. As initial health is strongly correlated with health at a later stage, comparing the health
outcomes of individuals with and without transition into employment would be prone to selection bias.
In the non-experimental setting of this study, identiﬁcation requires us to control for all factors that are
jointly related to the transition into employment or a programme, and to health. Besides initial health, it
is acknowledged in the literature that socio-economic factors such as education, age, occupation,
wealth, and income are strongly correlated with health (see for instance Llena-Nozal et al., 2004;
Mulatu and Schooler, 2002), while they also determine an individual’s labour market perspectives. The
same argument is likely to hold for the individual labour market history. A long working life and
particular occupations might harm physical health while the effect on mental health might go in either
direction, depending on an individual’s willingness or reluctance to work as well as the level of stress
associated with a particular type of job. Furthermore, holding a particular position in a company may
shape behaviour and habits related to health.
Particularly with regard to mental health one can think of many potential confounding factors that
affect both the outcome and the welfare state. For example, being a single parent is likely to hamper
employment and might also be related to psychological distress (see for instance Olson and Pavetti,
1996). Similar arguments hold for social integration (e.g. having friends who offer support), migrant
status, and local labour market conditions.
Below we will argue that we observe all important confounders, i.e. relevant factors that jointly
determine the welfare state and the health outcomes, such that potential health (for different
hypothetical welfare states) is independent of the actual welfare state conditional on these confounders.
This so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) implies that a (non-) transition from welfare
to employment or a programme is quasi-random when controlling for the observed confounders.13 It
allows us to identify average health effects of employment and programme participation for various
populations by comparing the health states of individuals in different welfare states who are comparable
with respect to the confounders.
5.1.2. Motivation for identiﬁcation based on the CIA. We conclude from the last section that the
identiﬁcation of health effects related to employment and programme participation requires very rich
information with respect to potential confounders. Our data cover all important individual socio-
economic variables such as gender, education, age, profession, past occupations, migrant status, marital
status, and dummies for being a single parent and taking care of (small) children.
Income and wealth are captured by the sources of income (e.g. employment or welfare), the amount of
the welfare beneﬁt as well as up to 10 years of past earnings and beneﬁt histories. We are able to control
13For an in-depth discussion of the CIA, see for instance Imbens (2004).
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for previous spells of employment, welfare receipt, unemployment, and out of labour force status for up
to 10 years. Furthermore, the survey comprises information on social support coming from family
members, friends, or institutions, and on the social background (e.g. ‘I know many welfare recipients’ or
‘a lot of friends are successful in their jobs’) which might jointly affect (mental) health and employment
probabilities.
On the household level, the data comprise the number of children younger than 6, the number of
household members, the relation to the person we look at, and the employment status of all household
members, among others. The latter variables proxy, for example, social background, labour market
attachment, and income potential. Regarding regional characteristics, the local rate of total and long-
term unemployment, the population density, the distance to the next big city, and several economic
performance indicators are included.
Furthermore, we can characterize in great detail the public employment ofﬁces with respect to their
organisational dimensions and the counselling strategies, which might affect job and programme
placements as well as satisfaction and mental health. Such variables are intenseness and aims of
activation and case management, existence of organisational obstacles as well as average number of
welfare recipients per caseworker. In the survey we also observe how satisﬁed welfare recipients are both
concerning their situation in general, and concerning the work of the employment ofﬁce in particular.
However, there might still be factors related to employment and health that are not observed in the
data. E.g., motivation and attitude towards work may impact labour market success and mental health.
This could entail an overestimation of the health effects, if more motivated individuals are more likely
to ﬁnd employment and have on average a better mental health state (e.g. due to positive thinking). One
might raise similar concerns about selection bias with respect to further unobservables such as criminal
activities and legal offenses, appearance and social behaviour, as well as alcoholism and drug use (which
are asked in the survey but are likely to be misreported due to social norms). Yet, a very important
argument in favour of a selection-on-observables strategy is the fact that we observe and, thus, can
condition on the pre-transition values of the outcome variables measuring health, as all outcomes are
measured at both interviews. Therefore, even if there are remaining unobserved factors that affect both
the welfare state and the outcomes, we capture at least their time-constant components by conditioning
on pre-transition outcomes.14
The data used are unusually informative compared to recent studies examining the health effects of
unemployment or job loss, which either rely on surveys (Gallo et al., 2000, 2006; Burgard et al., 2005;
Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009) or on administrative data (Kuhn et al., 2007, Browning et al., 2006),
but never on linked data. Moreover, we also have detailed information on the performance of the local
labour market and on how the employment ofﬁces work. Finally, in contrast to the majority of studies
investigating effects on health outcomes, we can condition on the pre-transition values of the outcome
variables. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the most important potential confounders are observed
and that the health effects of employment and programme participation can be identiﬁed.
5.2. Estimation
All possible parametric, semi-, and nonparametric estimators of causal effects that allow for effect
heterogeneity (see Section 7) are implicitly or explicitly built on the principle that in order to determine
the effects of being in one state instead of the other (e.g. employment vs. welfare), outcomes should be
compared of individuals in both welfare states that are comparable, meaning that they possess the same
distribution of confounders. Here, adjusted propensity score matching estimators are used to produce
14Note that in this sense our identiﬁcation strategy is very similar to a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. However, by using
matching and conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes rather than using DiD we avoid issues related to the choice of the pre-
intervention period and the dependence of the validity of our identifying assumption on the deﬁnition or functional form of the
outcome variables (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
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such comparisons. These estimators deﬁne ‘similarity’ of these two groups in terms of the probability to
be observed in one or the other state conditional on the confounders. This conditional probability is
called the propensity score (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, for the basic ideas). We estimate the
propensity scores used to correct for selection into welfare states based on probit models. The
speciﬁcations and coefﬁcient estimates for the various propensity score models are provided in the
Internet appendix. These models have been tested extensively against misspeciﬁcation (non-normality,
heteroscedasticity, omitted variables).
The matching procedure used in this paper incorporates the improvements suggested by Lechner
et al. (2009). These improvements tackle two issues: (i) To allow for higher precision when many ‘good’
comparison observations are available, they incorporate the idea of calliper or radius matching (e.g.
Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algorithm used for example by Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002).
(ii) Furthermore, matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact that appropriately weighted
regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double robustness property.
This property implies that the estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is based on a
correctly speciﬁed selection model, or the regression model is correctly speciﬁed (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe
et al., 2004). Moreover, this procedure should reduce small sample as well as asymptotic bias of
matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and thus increase robustness of the estimator. The
exact structure of this estimator is shown in Table AI in Appendix A.
There is an issue here on how to draw inference. Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that the ‘standard’
matching estimator (nearest neighbour or ﬁxed number of comparisons) is not smooth enough and,
therefore, bootstrap-based inference is not valid. However, the matching-type estimator implemented
here is by construction smoother than the one studied by Abadie and Imbens (2008) because we use a
variable number of comparisons and apply the bias adjustment procedure on top. Therefore, it is
presumed that the bootstrap is valid. It is implemented following MacKinnon (2006) by bootstrapping
the p-values of the t-statistic directly based on symmetric rejection regions using 4999 bootstrap
replications.15
Two issues affecting the appropriateness of matching estimators are common support with respect to
the propensity score and match quality. If there is insufﬁcient common support in the different welfare
states, no appropriate matches are at hand for a subset of observations. For this reason, we discard any
observation in one state having a higher or lower propensity score estimate than, respectively, the
maximum or minimum in the other state. This, of course, affects the population the causal effects refer
to given that discarded observations systematically differ from the original sample. If the sample size is
considerably reduced due to the common support restriction, one might therefore argue that the effects
are not representative for the target population any more. Fortunately, this is not a serious issue in our
estimations as the common support is well above 90% for all comparisons of welfare states (94% for
W-E, 95% for W-P, and 92% for E-P).
The match quality concerns the question whether the distribution of the confounders is balanced
among matched observations in different welfare states implying that comparable individuals with
respect to the confounder values were actually matched. Checking the means and medians of potential
confounders for matched individuals in different welfare states suggests that the after-match balance is
high for all comparisons of welfare states. The Internet appendix includes after-match t-statistics and
standardized difference tests (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) for the variables in the probit
speciﬁcations as well as w2-statistics for joint independence of the regressors and the welfare state in the
respective matched sample (see Tables I.7 to I.9). None of the test statistics points to covariate
imbalance after matching.
15Bootstrapping the p-values directly as compared to bootstrapping the distribution of the effects or the standard errors has
advantages because the ‘t-statistics’ on which the p-values are based may be asymptotically pivotal whereas the standard errors
or the coefﬁcient estimates are certainly not.
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6. RESULTS
This section presents our main effect estimates obtained by semi-parametric propensity score matching.
Results for semi-parametric IV regressions and parametric estimates are used as robustness checks and
are discussed in Section 8.
We are particularly interested in the average health effects of ﬁnding employment (E) for at least one
month between the two interviews vs. remaining on welfare (W) for the entire population of welfare
recipients who either ﬁnd employment or remain on welfare. We denote these average effects as EW.
Analogously, PW and EP denote the average health effects of programme participation vs. welfare and
employment vs. programme participation, respectively. From a theoretical perspective, the impact of
switching into employment is ambiguous. Individuals might face higher job-related health risks and suffer a
decrease in mental health if work is perceived as a burden. On the other hand, a job may increase self-esteem
and thus, mental health, and it could also affect individual behaviour in a way that augments physical health.
The empirical results in Table II suggest that the transition to work has a positive impact on health.
While the increase in overall health is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant, there is a large and
signiﬁcant positive effect on the daily work capacity: the probability of having a work capacity of 6 or
more hrs per day increases by 11 percentage points from 0.79 to 0.9. Moreover, the number of
symptoms is reduced signiﬁcantly by 0.19. The prevalence of mental symptoms decreases by 8
percentage points (from 0.30 to 0.22) which may be driven by the decline in nerval problems, anxieties,
and sleeping problems. Furthermore, working individuals are less likely to feel lethargic and depressed
by 8 percentage points compared to their matched counterparts. In contrast, physical symptoms do not
seem to be affected much, at least for the short follow-up period considered.
According to the psychological and medical literature, several underlying factors may drive the
positive (mental) health effects of employment. E.g., Evans and Repper (2000) argue that work is a major
determinant of social inclusion that provides a sense of purpose and belonging, a social forum, and social
recognition. Similarly, Gove and Geerken (1977) point out that employed individuals possess a further
social network (in addition to the environment at home), which might serve as a major source of
gratiﬁcation, i.e. workers have a broader structural base than non-workers.16 Thus, ﬁnding employment
may positively affect self-perception and life satisfaction. In turn, a less negative attitude is likely to
increase mental health, see for instance McGlashan and Carpenter (1981) and Birchwood et al. (1993).
If programme participation entailed similar health effects as the welfare-to-work transition, policy-
makers could be interested in assigning welfare recipients to public welfare-to-work programmes to
improve their health. However, by comparing individuals participating in a programme (P) to those
remaining on welfare (W) conditional on no programme participation at interview 1 we obtain
ambiguous results. The increase in the work capacity is weakly signiﬁcant for the 5-point scale variable
and insigniﬁcant for the indicator variable. However, programme participation also increases the
prevalence of mental symptoms by 9 percentage points from 0.34 to 0.43 (again weakly signiﬁcant). All
other results are insigniﬁcant. Notably, the effects on the symptoms go in either direction and the effect
on overall health is close to zero.
Our ﬁndings therefore suggest that programme participation does on average not have such
pronounced and unambiguously positive effects on health as employment. This is also conﬁrmed by the
direct comparison of a transition into employment vs. programme participation conditional on neither
being in a programme, nor in employment at interview 1. The increase in the daily work capacity
(binary) and the decrease in the prevalence of mental symptoms are signiﬁcant at the 10%- and 5%-
level, respectively. Apart from the prevalence of sleeping problems, all other estimates are insigniﬁcant,
16The detrimental effects of unemployment on mental health in terms of anxiety, depression, loss of conﬁdence, and identity have
been extensively discussed in the psychological and medical literature (e.g. Jahoda, 1979; Smith, 1985).
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which may be due to the small sample size and/or the presence of less pronounced effects of employment
relative to programme participations for some of the outcomes.
7. HETEROGENEITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate whether there are subgroups of individuals that particularly beneﬁt from a
transition into employment in terms of health. For this purpose, we estimate the health effects
separately for subsamples deﬁned by the welfare state between the two interviews, gender, migrant
status, age, education, and initial health.
Table III presents the average effects by welfare state. E.g. we evaluate the average health effects of
employment (E) vs. welfare (W) on those actually switching into employment (and not on the entire
population as in Section 5). We denote these parameters as EW|E, indicating that the average effects are
conditional on the state ‘employment’. Analogously, EW|W represents the average health effect on
those remaining on welfare. Accordingly, the average effects of a programme (P) vs. welfare (W) on
programme participants and welfare recipients without programme are PW|P and PW|W. EP|E and
EP|P denote the average effects of employment vs. programme for the employed and programme
participants, respectively.
Comparing the transition into employment vs. remaining on welfare we ﬁnd that EW|W are
generally larger and more often signiﬁcant than EW|E. This implies that the positive health effects are
more pronounced for individuals with less favourable socio-economic characteristics, which more often
appear in the group remaining on welfare. Most of the statistically signiﬁcant EW|W estimates are
similar or slightly higher than the corresponding EW results. Notably, the effect on the daily work
capacity is even stronger. This suggests that those who would beneﬁt the most from a job placement do
actually not get or take this opportunity.
All PW|P estimates apart from the positive and weakly signiﬁcant effect on scale-measured work
capacity are insigniﬁcant, which may be partly due to the smaller sample size. The PW|W results are
similar in magnitude and signiﬁcance to the PW estimates. EP|E and EP|P estimates for the daily work
capacity and mental symptoms go into the same direction as EP estimates.
Table II. Average health effect estimates for employment vs welfare receipt (EW), programme participation vs
welfare receipt (PW), and employment vs programme participation (EP)
EW p-Value PW p-Value EP p-Value
Work capacity per day (scale, 1: o3 h, 4: 81 h) 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.51
Capable of working 6 or more hours per day (binary) 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.07 0.08
Health (scale, 1: very good, 5: poor) 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.85
Very good, good or satisfactory health (binary) 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.66 0.03 0.66
Prevalence of psychosomatic symptoms (binary) 0.02 0.55 0.04 0.32 0.07 0.16
Prevalence of mental symptoms (binary) 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.05
Prevalence of physical symptoms (binary) 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.83 0.07 0.30
Number of symptoms (integer) 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.41 0.01 0.97
Gastro-intestinal problems (binary) 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.89
Cardiovascular problems (binary) 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.71 0.02 0.74
Nerval problems, anxieties (binary) 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.18
Allergies, skin problems (binary) 0.03 0.30 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.14
Probl. w. back, neck, spine, intervertebral discs (bin.) 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.72 0.06 0.36
Problems with bones, joints (binary) 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.06 0.21
Problems with sleeping (binary) 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05
Other symptoms (binary) 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.77 0.00 0.84
No symptoms (binary) 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.91 0.05 0.48
Often lethargic and depressed (binary) 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.05 0.26
Notes: Bold and italic: Effect signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Bold: Effect signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Italic: Effect signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. p-values from bootstrap with 4999 replications.
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Table IV reports average health effect estimates for various subgroups deﬁned by gender, migrant status,
age, education, and initial health. Several patterns are worth noting. Most strikingly, the health effects
appear to be much larger for males. The positive effects on men’s overall health and daily work capacity as
well as the decrease in the number of symptoms and the prevalence of mental symptoms and lethargy are
large and signiﬁcant. In contrast, the effects on women’s health are substantially smaller and insigniﬁcant in
most cases (apart from the effect on the daily work capacity). This suggests that women’s health is much
more inert with respect to the employment state than men’s. One potential explanation for this result might
be that males value employment more than females and feel a larger pressure to provide for themselves and,
if existing, their family such that they suffer from higher psychological distress when remaining on welfare.
A second potential explanation is part-time work, which is much more common among women than among
men. Thus, the transition from welfare receipt to employment in terms of effective labour market
attachment is much stronger for men than for women, which might explain the differences in the effects.17
The other results in the ﬁrst panel of Table IV are less clear-cut, but the positive health effects of
employment seem to be somewhat higher for migrants and prime-age workers in most cases. The role of
education is at best ambiguous. For example, general health is more strongly increased for individuals
with vocational training than for those with a higher education (technical school, college, or university),
but the converse is true for the daily work capacity. In contrast, the second panel of Table IV reveals
that there appears to be substantial effect heterogeneity with respect to initial health. Those reporting
poorer overall health in interview 1 beneﬁt most from a transition into employment as becomes obvious
from the strong increase in the daily work capacity, the substantial decrease in the number of symptoms,
and the reduced likelihood to face mental symptoms and to feel depressed. As one would expect from
the results discussed so far, health effects are strongest for males with bad initial health. T-tests indicate
that the positive effects on the daily work capacity and the reduction in mental symptoms are
signiﬁcantly higher for men with poor health than for those with better health conditions. In contrast,
the health effects for females seem to vary less with respect to initial health and are not signiﬁcantly
different for those with poor vs. better health.
Table III. Average health effect estimates by welfare state for employment vs welfare (EW), programme vs welfare
(PW), and employment vs programme (EP)
EW|E EW|W PW|P PW|W EP|E EP|P
Work capacity per day (scale, 1: o3 h, 4: 81 h) 0.09 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.07
Capable of working 6 or more hours per day (binary) 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.07
Health (scale, 1: very good, 5: poor) 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.07
Very good, good or satisfactory health (binary) 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.01
Prevalence of psychosomatic symptoms (binary) 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.00
Prevalence of mental symptoms (binary) 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.10
Prevalence of physical symptoms (binary) 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.05
Number of symptoms (integer) 0.07 0.33 0.14 0.16 0.01 0.03
Gastro-intestinal problems (binary) 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Cardiovascular problems (binary) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Nerval problems, anxieties (binary) 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05
Allergies, skin problems (binary) 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03
Probl. w. back, neck, spine, intervertebral discs (bin.) 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02
Problems with bones, joints (binary) 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.10
Problems with sleeping (binary) 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.08
Other symptoms (binary) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
No symptoms (binary) 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05
Often lethargic and depressed (binary) 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.08
Notes: Bold and italic: Effect signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Bold: Effect signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Italic: Effect signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. p-Values from bootstrap with 4999 replications.
17We thank an anonymous referee for pointing to this possibility.
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8. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the effects parametrically using OLS for the health
and work capacity measured by scales and probit speciﬁcations for the binary health outcomes. For
each comparison we regress the health outcomes on a binary transition indicator (e.g. 1 for employment
and 0 for welfare) and on all variables included in the respective propensity score speciﬁcation. The
parametric methods neither account for effect heterogeneity nor for non-linearities between the welfare
state, the covariates, and the health outcomes.
Table BI in Appendix B presents the effect estimates and analytical p-values. For the binary outcomes,
the health effects are evaluated at the respective sample’s mean characteristics of X. The employment
transition’s effects on the prevalence of mental symptoms and feelings of depression are negative while the
daily work capacity is increased. Most of the effect estimates related to programme participation are again
statistically insigniﬁcant. Overall, we ﬁnd effects very similar to the ones based on matching. Thus, we
conclude that the parametric results, albeit prone to potential speciﬁcation bias, support our main results.18
9. CONCLUSION
We estimate the effects of a transition from welfare to employment or to welfare-to-work programmes
on various physical and mental health outcomes by analysing a combination of exceptionally
informative survey and administrative data on German welfare recipients that have been linked to
regional information and characteristics of employment ofﬁces. The richness of the data as well as the
possibility to condition on the pre-transition states of the outcome variables allows us to control for the
relevant confounding factors in our estimation based on semi-parametric propensity score matching.
We also use semi-parametric IV estimators and parametric regressions to check the robustness of the
matching estimates and ﬁnd no contradictory results.
The results suggest that employment increases health in general andmental health in particular, as evidenced
by substantial decreases in the prevalence of mental symptoms and feelings of depression, and an improved
daily work capacity. These effects are mainly driven by males, suggesting that women’s health is relatively inert
with respect to the employment state. Moreover, welfare recipients with less favourable characteristics, in
particular with bad initial health, seem to be more likely to beneﬁt than the better risks. Effects are most
pronounced for males with bad initial health. Therefore, it seems that at least some of the adverse effects on
health that have been documented in the literature on job displacement (e.g. Kuhn et al., 2007; Browning et al.,
2006) are potentially reversible. In contrast, the effect of programme participation is ambiguous andmost effect
estimates are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Thus, keeping unemployed individuals ‘busy’ in welfare-
to-work programmes ceteris paribus entails poorer health states than a placement into employment.
These ﬁndings appear to be relevant for the design of welfare policies, as a good health state is
desirable for various reasons. Better health not only increases the individual wellbeing of welfare
recipients, it most likely improves their productivity and future employability, reduces their probability
to exit the labour force via disability insurance schemes, and decreases health and other social insurance
costs. These arguments apply to health in general, but also to mental health in particular. The disutility
and social costs related to mental health problems (as depressions) are often as high or even higher than
those of physical deﬁciencies, see for instance Druss et al. (2000). From this perspective, a ‘work ﬁrst’
approach, which focuses on a fast (re-)integration into the labour market (e.g. by means of wage
subsidies) rather than an extensive use of welfare-to-work programmes (e.g. public workfare) in the
activation process, seems to be in the interest of both policy-makers and welfare recipients.
18As a further robustness check, we applied a semiparametric instrumental variable (IV) approach (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994;
Fro¨lich, 2007) to estimate the health effects. However, the estimates turned out to be rather imprecise. Therefore, all details on
IV identiﬁcation, estimation, and the results are provided in the Internet appendix (http://www.sew.unisg.ch/lechner/h4_health).
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APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE MATCHING ESTIMATOR USED
The parameter used to deﬁne the radius for the distance-weighted radius matching (R) is set to 90%.
This value refers to the distance of the worst match in a one-to-one matching and is deﬁned in terms of
the propensity score. Different values for R are checked in the sensitivity analysis in Lechner et al.
(2009). The results were robust as long as R did not become ‘too large’ (Table AI).
Table AI. A matching protocol for the estimation of a counterfactual outcome and the effects
Step 1 Specify a reference distribution deﬁned by X
Step 2 Pool the observations forming the reference distribution and the participants in the respective period.
Code an indicator variable D, which is 1 if the observation belongs to the reference distribution. All indices,
0 or 1, used below relate to the actual or potential values of D
Step 3 Specify and estimate a binary probit for p(x)5P(D5 1|X5 x)
Step 4 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the
smallest maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples deﬁned by D
Step 4 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables
Standard propensity score matching step (multiple treatments)
(a1) Choose one observation in the subsample deﬁned by D5 1 and delete it from that pool
(b1) Find an observation in the subsample deﬁned by D5 0 that is as close as possible to
the one chosen in step
(a1) in terms of p(x), ~x. ‘Closeness’ is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove
that observation, so that it can be used again
(c1) Repeat (a1) and (b1) until no observation with D5 1 is left
Exploit thick support of X to increase efﬁciency (radius matching step)
(d1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between a member of
the reference distribution and matched comparison observations
(a2) Repeat (a1)
(b2) Repeat (b1). If possible, ﬁnd other observations in the subsample of D5 0 that are at least
as close as R  d to the one chosen in step
(a2) (to gain efﬁciency). Do not remove these observations, so that they can be used again.
Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to their distance.
Normalise the weights such that they add to one
(c2) Repeat (a2) and (b2) until no participant in D5 1 is left
(d2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in (a2) and (b2)
Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression
(e) Using the weights w(xi) obtained in (d2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable
on the variables used to deﬁne the distance (and an intercept)
(f1) Predict the potential outcome y0(xi) of every observation using the coefﬁcients of this regression: y^
0ðxiÞ
(f2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for E(Y0|D5 1) as:
PN
i¼1
1ðD ¼ 1Þy^0ðx1Þ
N1

1ðD ¼ 0Þwiy^0ðx0Þ
N0
(g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome
variables in D5 0
Subtract the bias from this estimate to get dEðY0jD ¼ 1Þ
Step 5 Repeat Steps 2 to 4 with the nonparticipants playing the role of participants before. This gives
the desired estimate of the counterfactual nonparticipation outcome
Step 6 The difference of the potential outcomes is the desired estimate of the effect with respect
to the reference distribution speciﬁed in Step 1
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APPENDIX B: ESTIMATES OF THE ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
The effect estimates and analytical p-values are given in Table BI.
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